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Collective Regional Image: 
Logics of Consciousness and Modes of Management in Post-
Cold War Africa and Southeast Asia
Brooke Coe
Abstract
One distinguishing feature of the “new” regionalism is its outward orientation – the increased importance 
of the external dimension of regional cooperation. It makes sense, then, that efforts to manage external 
perceptions of a region, on the part of policy-relevant actors in that region, might contribute to import-
ant changes to regional norms and institutions. By and large, though, existing accounts of normative and 
institutional change at the regional level do not explicitly conceptualize and theorize collective image con-
sciousness and management.  This paper offers an initial attempt to address this conceptual gap, making 
use of two cases of regional image crisis (post-Cold War Africa and post-1997 Southeast Asia) in order to 
draw out logics of regional image consciousness and to distinguish among types of regional image man-
agement efforts. As regional communities of states, Africa and Southeast Asia promoted and adhered to 
a relatively strict interpretation of the principle of non-interference during the Cold War period. In the 
post-Cold War era, the non-interference norm has eroded in both regions. In each, these developments 
constituted – in part – a collective image management strategy, aimed at external audiences. Reforms to 
regional institutions were promoted in part as efforts to ameliorate negative international perceptions.
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1. Introduction1 
One distinguishing feature of the “new” regionalism is its outward orientation – the increased importance 
of the external dimension of regional cooperation (Krapohl/Meissner/Muntschick 2014; Büthe/Milner 
2008; Jaumotte 2004). It makes sense, then, that efforts to manage external	perceptions of a region, on the 
part of policy-relevant actors in that region, might contribute to important changes to regional norms and 
institutions. By and large, though, existing accounts of normative and institutional change at the regional 
level do not explicitly conceptualize and theorize collective image consciousness and management.2 This 
paper offers an initial attempt to address this conceptual gap. Making use of two cases of regional image 
crisis, it draws out logics of regional image consciousness and distinguishes among types of regional image 
management efforts. Section 3 unpacks two primary logics of regional image consciousness: the logic of in-
fluence and the logic of resources. A region’s collective image with respect to (dys)function and norm (non)
compliance matters to policy-relevant actors in the region because it affects the region’s political influence 
in international arenas and because it affects the region’s ability to attract resources from donors and inves-
tors. Because these policy-relevant actors are conscious of these potential consequences, they engage in a 
variety of regional image management strategies, discussed in Section 4. I make two key distinctions here; 
the first is between emulation and distinction strategies and the second is between cosmetic “branding” 
efforts and substantive policy changes. 
The conceptual categories presented in this paper are based both on existing theory (developed for the 
state level) and on two cases of regional image crisis: post-1980s Africa and post-1997 Southeast Asia. As 
regional communities of states, Africa and Southeast Asia promoted and adhered to a relatively strict 
interpretation of the principle of non-interference during the Cold War period.3 Domestic political and 
security problems, considered matters of exclusive domestic jurisdiction by these groups of postcolonial 
states, generally did not elicit regional interference aimed at their management. In the post-Cold War era, 
the norm of non-interference has eroded (albeit to different degrees) in both Africa and Southeast Asia 
through the introduction of regional institutions and/or practices that infringe on state sovereignty. In 
both cases, these developments constituted – in part – a collective image management strategy, aimed 
at external audiences. Reforms of regional institutions were promoted in part as strategies to ameliorate 
negative international perceptions. Section 2 presents overviews of these two cases in order to provide an 
empirical foundation for theory presented in Sections 3 and 4.
1 This working paper is a product of research and writing supported by the KFG during the author’s 2015-16 postdoc-
toral fellowship in residence at the Free University Berlin.
2 For important exceptions, see Jetschke 2015 and Jetschke/Murray 2012.
3 This is even more so the case for Southeast Asia than for Africa, as the Organization of African Unity had already (1) 
deployed a peacekeeping mission (to Chad) and (2) adopted a human rights charter providing for a human rights 
commission with investigatory powers during the late Cold War period. 
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2. Case Overviews
2.1 The African Case
African states experienced a severe economic crisis in the 1980s (Africa’s “Lost Decade”), bringing negative 
international attention to the continent and prompting state and other policy-relevant relevant actors 
in Africa to express alarm about Africa’s increasingly negative international image. In speeches given by 
African leaders and regional bureaucrats at regional forums in the 1980s we find repeated lamentation 
of the region’s problem of “bad publicity” (OAU 1984: 10) and similar complaints (e.g. Mengistu Haile-
Mariam 1984: 14). By the end of this decade of severe economic crisis, regional reform-minded actors 
had begun discursively linking Africa’s international image problem to the continent’s actual and potential 
economic and political marginalization, making the case that the empowerment of regional institutions 
to manage domestic problems would help combat and compensate for this marginalization. One key re-
former was Adebayo Adedeji, then-Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Africa (UNECA), who noted in conference addresses that the international community had increasingly 
come to see Africa as a lost cause. He called for African leaders to collectively address the continent’s myr-
iad problems in order to increase foreign aid flows (African Leadership Forum 1988: 39, 43). 
The end of the Cold War only exacerbated Africa’s vulnerabilities: it introduced rival recipients for interna-
tional aid and investment (Central and Eastern European states); it ended superpower clientelism based 
on East-West competition; and it increased the attachment of (liberal) political conditionalities to Western 
loans and aid (OAU 1990a). One of the figures that joined Adedeji in his calls for reform was Olusegun 
Obasanjo, former president of Nigeria and founder of the African Leadership Forum, a civil society organi-
zation seeking “African solutions to African problems.” Obasanjo urged African states to work to improve 
Africa’s international image in response to overwhelmingly negative portrayals of it in the media. The re-
forms Obasanjo and African Leadership Forum supporters wanted to see would involve a “redefinition 
of security and sovereignty” in African international society and the development of the OAU’s conflict 
management capabilities (Obasanjo/Mosha 1993: 260). These proposals were outlined in the Kampala 
Document, the product of the organization’s high-profile 1991 Kampala Forum.
In collaboration with the UNECA’s secretariat and the African Leadership Forum, Organization of African 
Unity’s (OAU) Secretary General Salim Ahmed Salim lobbied OAU member states in the early 1990s to 
reform regional institutions and to cede some of their sovereignty in order to more effectively respond – 
collectively – to governance and security problems on the continent. This reform campaign resulted in the 
initiation of processes4 leading to the establishment of a conflict management mechanism in 1993 that was, 
for the first time, mandated to respond to intrastate conflict. The 1990-93 period saw the first dispatch of 
election observation missions, an important increase in regional mediation missions, and the deployment 
of two OAU military missions (in Burundi and Rwanda) (Coe 2015b). Reflecting in 1993 on the reforms tak-
ing place at the continental level, former Sudanese ambassador to the United Nations Francis Deng pointed 
to the role of image consciousness as a motivating factor:
4 I provide more details about these processes in Section 3.2.
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[…]	the	imperatives	of	global	interdependence	propel	[Africans]	to	resist	marginalization.	Their	aim	is	to	
put	their	houses	in	order	through	regional	resolution	to	conflicts	and	improved	economic	performance,	
then	return	 to	participating	 in	 international	affairs	with	a	 renewed	sense	of	political	and	economic	
legitimacy	(Deng	1993:	112).
The regional reform agenda accelerated over the course of the 1990s, resulting in the establishment of a re-
gional anti-coup regime (institutionalized regional responses to unconstitutional changes in government) 
and leading up to the replacement at the turn of the century of the OAU by the African Union, an organi-
zation with a much more intrusive mandate, including non-consensual military intervention in response 
to “grave circumstances” (OAU 2000: Article 4(h)). A key player in this institutional transformation in the 
late 1990s, South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki, called for the establishment of a more intrusive organization – with 
its greater ability to promote human rights, democracy, and peace in member states – in part as a way to 
attract more foreign direct investment to the continent (Tieku 2004: 253).
2.2 The Southeast Asian Case
Unlike Africa, Southeast Asia experienced incredible economic growth in the 1980s, and Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states expressed satisfaction with their region’s (and particularly their 
regional organization’s) positive international image in the late 1980s and in the immediate post-Cold War 
period (Yukawa 2011). The region’s image of success served to reaffirm and reinforce the ASEAN norm-
set – including the norm of non-interference – rather than call it into question, and it empowered ASEAN 
to take a leadership role in the wider Asia-Pacific, exporting their norms through the establishment of 
ASEAN Regional Forum and other activities (Acharya 2014: 199; Jones 2009a: 2; Yukawa 2011: 266). But 
this golden period was not to last. The 1997 Asian financial crisis tarnished ASEAN’s international image 
and called its distinctive norms into question. What began with currency collapse in Thailand developed 
into a serious economic crisis affecting many countries in the Asia Pacific and resulted in investor panic and 
the diversion of foreign funds out of the region (Narine 2002: 183). Growth rates plummeted, many firms 
were bankrupted, and several countries in the region were forced to request “costly and politically humil-
iating” International Monetary Fund-led bailouts (The Economist 2007). ASEAN states began articulating 
concerns about changing international perceptions and the threat of “marginalization,” often using very 
similar language to their African counterparts (Jones 2010: 494). The economic crisis opened up the asso-
ciation (and its pro-sovereignty norm-set, the ASEAN Way5) to criticism for its ineffectiveness (Narine 2002: 
184) and for its accommodation of illiberalism (Acharya 1999: 420). And, again, reform-minded actors (in 
this case, primarily state actors) proposed changes to regional norms and institutions – changes that would 
result in the circumscription of the norm of non-interference. 
Beginning in 1997, Thai foreign minister Surin Pitsuwan initiated a debate within ASEAN about the contin-
ued utility and appropriateness of strict non-interference. In the lead-up to the July 1998 ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting, he put forward a proposal for a revision of the non-interference policy: “flexible engagement.” 
5 A set of sovereignty-promoting regulative and procedural norms practiced by ASEAN states since 1967.
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Flexible engagement would permit ASEAN to collectively discuss and publicly comment on member states’ 
domestic problems if these problems could be shown to have regional implications (Haacke 1999: 583). 
The proposal was aimed at both economic and political issues, as it would allow for peer review of eco-
nomic policies as well as criticism of “unacceptable internal conduct” (related to violations of human rights 
and democracy norms) (Acharya 2003: 382). For Surin, flexible engagement was to shift emphasis from 
member state rights to member state responsibilities: “responsibilities for engagement, that is for contrib-
uting to the achievement of common regional goals” (quoted in Jones 2008: 275). Several (related) con-
cerns motivated Thailand’s proposed departure from the ASEAN Way. Like other members, it considered 
the financial crisis to be a threat to the association’s international standing and relevance. The reasoning 
was that crisis exposed the need for liberal economic and political reforms in ASEAN states, and that these 
reforms would be necessary to regain the confidence and support of investors – and the international 
community more broadly – and to achieve economic recovery (Jones 2008: 275; Acharya 2003: 381, 383). 
Although ASEAN rejected Surin’s flexible engagement proposal (and instead agreed to a watered-down 
version – “enhanced interaction”), some erosion of the ASEAN Way (and therefore of the non-interference 
norm) is apparent and is arguably at least partially attributable to regional image management imperatives. 
Evidence of norm change includes ASEAN states’ participation in the 1999 United Nations peacekeep-
ing mission to East Timor (Dupont 2000); ASEAN’s increased pressure on Myanmar to liberalize politically 
(Jones 2010); and the development of more formal regional institutions like the ASEAN Economic, Security, 
and Socio-Cultural Communities, the ASEAN Charter, and the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission for 
Human Rights (Jones 2010: 494; Jetschke 2015). Since the mid-2000s, Indonesia has taken the lead in 
promoting these kinds of reforms in ASEAN (Sukma 2011).
3. Two Logics of Regional Image Consciousness
Why do state and other policy-relevant actors (i.e. regional bureaucrats) care about the image of their 
region and/or regional organization (RO) (in addition to that of their individual state)? In this section, I dis-
cuss two logics of image consciousness, the logic of influence and the logic of resources, drawing on theory 
developed for the state level and on the two cases of regional image crisis introduced above: post-1980s 
Africa and post-1997 Southeast Asia. 
Before discussing these instrumental logics, I first acknowledge that an “emotive” logic may also be at 
play. As Steve Wood argues in his analysis of the role of prestige in international politics, “instrumental 
and emotive energies and purposes” are not so easy to pull apart empirically, since they are “interwo-
ven” (Wood 2013: 389). According to an emotive logic of image consciousness, image matters for its own 
sake. This resonates with classical realists’ notion of honor (Thucydides 1903; Joshi 2008) and Ned Lebow’s 
assertion that the drive for esteem is one primary motivation underlying international relations – indi-
viduals, organizations, and states value it in “its own right” (Lebow 2006: 433). That is, states seek status 
or prestige not only for the potential attendant material benefits, but also because external perceptions 
and recognition are a source of pride or shame. Image matters because of its relationship to identity – it 
affects a state’s self-esteem or confidence. If they identify with their region/RO, state actors and regional 
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bureaucrats will also intrinsically value – to some degree – their collective regional image. For these actors, 
external perceptions can be a cause for concern – and the improvement of the regional image a legitimate 
political project – again, for its own sake. For example, one analyst with ties to the South African regime 
reported in the late 1990s that Thabo Mbeki – a leader whose Africanist foreign policy contributed to the 
creation of the African Union – “takes Africa seriously and he is emotionally and intellectually committed to 
proving Afro-pessimism wrong” (quoted in Vale/Maseko 1998: 285).6 In the Southeast Asian case, ASEAN 
member states at summits in the early 1990s expressed satisfaction with the Association’s international 
image of success and linked external perceptions to collective self-esteem. For example, Malaysia’s foreign 
minister remarked in 1997, on the eve of the Asian financial crisis, that, “I think we have grown used to 
the praises heaped upon ASEAN. We welcome that recognition and we can be justifiably proud of ASEAN’s 
achievements over the past thirty years.”7 The financial crisis would soon tarnish ASEAN’s international 
image and injure this pride. 
In the two cases of regional image crisis under review here, however, those expressing alarm about their 
region’s increasingly negative international image rarely articulate purely “emotive” or “esteem” concerns; 
these are linked to “instrumental” concerns, often framed with the language of “marginalization.” In the 
following sections (2.1 and 2.2), then, I focus on these more important instrumental logics, distinguishing 
between the logic of influence (the loss of which constitutes political marginalization) and the logic of 
resources (the loss of which constitutes economic marginalization).
3.1	Image	Matters	because	It	Affects	a	Region’s	International	Influence
States care about their image or reputation because it may afford them greater political influence in in-
ternational arenas. Image is an important component of “soft power” (Nye 1990), or a state’s ability to 
attract and persuade. Whether external perceptions are “positive” or “negative” is one way to categorize 
them, but image type can be classified in other ways, as different perceived attributes (components of 
image) translate into different kinds of influence or perhaps serve as different avenues to the same kind of 
influence. A state might prioritize the development and maintenance of military might, not just because 
of the security it provides, but because it translates into respect and therefore influence. Or, a state might 
cultivate attributes unrelated to hard power in order to be seen, for example, as a norm complier (“good 
international citizen”) or norm leader. Wood argues that Canadian policymakers promote human rights in 
part to earn Canada recognition as a human rights leader. This kind of reputation “and accrued associated 
‘prestige capital’” is not just an end in itself; it affords Canada certain benefits, including “an enhanced 
capacity to set agendas” (Wood 2013: 397). 
6 Afro-pessimism refers of course to negative perceptions of the continent, often with respect to economic and 
political development.
7 30th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, 24-29 July 1997, in: http://www.asean.org/asean-political-security-commu-
nity/asean-foreign-ministers-meeting-amm/asean-foreign-ministerial-meetings/the-30th-ammpmc/; 10 April 2017.
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The logic of “influence via image” applies also to collective regional image, whether that be the image of 
the RO or the image of the region as a place/group of states. States and regional bureaucrats might care 
about the image of their RO, because they (desire to) utilize the RO as a means to gain influence in inter-
national politics (e.g. to set agendas in international forums, to “gate-keep” extraregional involvement in 
regional affairs, to export a particular set of norms, to have their needs and concerns taken seriously by 
powerful actors in the international system, et cetera).8 They might also care about the image of the region/
RO because it reflects on constituent states’ images and thereby affects their soft power as individual ac-
tors. Based on evidence from Southeast Asia and (to a lesser extent) Africa, I present two broad categories 
of perceived attributes that constitute a region’s image and afford it greater or lesser influence in interna-
tional politics: perceptions about policy effectiveness (i.e. is the region/RO “successful” – especially with 
respect to the economic performance of its constituent states?) and perceptions about norm compliance 
(does the region/RO live up to the values of the international community?). Although it is analytically use-
ful to establish these categories, they are interrelated in theory and practice. For example, effective policies 
may be required to achieve norm compliance. Furthermore, as I discuss below, an image of (economic) 
success may confer “performance legitimacy” on a region/RO and thereby shield it to some degree from 
international criticism about norm non-compliance (e.g. with respect to human rights and democracy).
3.1.1	Image	of	Success:	Perceptions	about	Policy	Effectiveness	
As noted above, ASEAN emerged from the 1980s with an image of success – based primarily on its mem-
ber states’ economic performance in the 1980s but also to some degree on the Association’s high-profile 
diplomacy on the Cambodian crisis and supposed contributions to inter-state peace in the region (Yukawa 
2011). ASEAN states expressed satisfaction about the region’s positive international image and conviction 
in Southeast Asia’s distinctive set of domestic and regional norms (so-called “Asian Values”9 and the ASEAN 
Way, respectively). In the face of the West’s proclamation of the “unabashed victory of economic and politi-
cal liberalism” (Fukuyama 1989: 3) and the rise of liberal internationalism in the wake of the Cold War’s end, 
the ASEAN states were empowered by their performance legitimacy to insist upon an alternative—illiberal 
political systems protected by sovereignty-reinforcing regionalism—and they did. Lee Jones summarizes 
this development nicely: 
[I]n	the	years	following	the	end	of	the	Cold	War,	[ASEAN]	was	widely	regarded	as	the	world’s	most	successful	
third-world	regional	institution,	and	as	a	model	for	wider	cooperation.	In	a	context	where	regional	policy-
makers	were	announcing	an	‘Asian	renaissance’	and	aggressively	promoting	‘Asian	values’	as	a	superior,	con-
textualised	alternative	to	the	West’s	liberal	triumphalism,	analysts	heralded	the	‘Pacific	century’	and	singled	
out	ASEAN	in	particular	as	offering	a	better	route	to	cooperation	than	Western	‘legalism’	(Jones	2009a:	2).
8 Most research on the link between the international perceptions of a RO and its international influence has per-
tained to the European Union (EU), i.e. whether or not the EU is seen (by states, organizations, and publics) to be a 
global leader (generally or in particular issue areas) or special normative power (because of its legitimacy and role 
in exporting norms) (see Chaban et al. 2013; Larsen 2014; Lucarelli/Fioramonti 2009).
9 A discourse that emphasizes collectivism over individualism and economic development over civil and political rights.
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Indonesian President Suharto’s address at the 23rd ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (July 1990) speaks to the rise 
of ASEAN’s international image: “Today, ASEAN has not only survived but has grown into a vigorous entity, 
with its presence, potentials and achievements appreciated, not only in our own region of East Asia but 
in the world at large” (Suharto 1990: 7). ASEAN’s 1987 Manila Declaration points to the “achievements of 
ASEAN in the last two decades, particularly in creating a political environment conducive to the develop-
ment of its members, and in carving out a distinct identity recognized and respected in the community of 
nations” (ASEAN 1987a). The 1987 Joint Press Statement of the Meeting of the ASEAN Heads of Government 
declares that “ASEAN has grown into a viable and dynamic organization fostering the spirit of regional co-
operation and solidarity and strengthening national and regional resilience […] ASEAN has also developed 
a distinct identity and has become an effective vehicle for joint approaches to regional and international 
issues” (ASEAN 1987b). In a 1992 speech, Prime Minister Ramos of the Philippines referred to ASEAN as the 
“most successful case of regionalization among developing countries” (quoted in Yukawa 2011: 264).
Economic success empowered ASEAN in the 1990s to expand its membership (by incorporating Vietnam, 
Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia), to assume a leadership position in East Asia through the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF), and to promote the ASEAN Way by encouraging extra-ASEAN accession to the 1976 Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation in which ASEAN’s distinct sovereignty-reinforcing norms are formalized. This has 
been referred to as “normative power ASEAN” (Goh 2011). Many ASEAN scholars suggest, for example, 
that the establishment of the ARF was made possible by ASEAN states’ consciousness of their successful 
international image. The Regional Forum was established in 1993 as a formal dialogue group for politi-
cal and security issues, whose membership now includes, in addition to the ASEAN states, several other 
Asian countries (including China) and extraregional members including the United States and the European 
Union (EU). According to Amitav Acharya, seizing a leadership role served to “underscor[e] the continued 
and broader relevance of ASEAN’s norms” (Acharya 2014: 168). ASEAN’s role in initiating the Forum “re-
flected its growing self-confidence about the relevance of its norms of regional cooperation” (Acharya 
2014: 199). Yukawa Taku similarly argues that “[U]sing the image of success that it had attained in the 
1980s as a platform, ASEAN greatly expanded its role in overseeing the regional order of the Indochina 
and Asia Pacific region in the 1990s, through the institutionalization of […] the [ASEAN Regional Forum]” 
(Yukawa 2011: 266). Shaun Narine attributes ASEAN’s international assertiveness to a “confidence born 
of economic success.” That ASEAN would lead and set the agenda for the Forum, despite the small size 
of its states, was justified by the grouping’s “collective economic potential and how that potential might 
translate into military clout in the future” (Narine 2002: 184).
Before the end of the decade, though, the Asian financial crisis – and ASEAN’s “organizational disunity” 
in the face of this crisis – challenged the foundations of ASEAN’s international influence (of its leader-
ship role in the region) (Narine 2002: 184). The loss of this ability to influence international politics via 
ASEAN (ASEAN’s diminished “relevance”) then became a preoccupation for ASEAN states in the post-1997 
financial crisis period. ASEAN states articulated concerns about changing international perceptions leading 
to the association’s political and economic marginalization. For example, Singapore’s foreign minister ex-
pressed concerns in 2000 that growing perceptions of ASEAN as an “ineffective […] sunset organization […] 
are political facts. Perceptions can define political reality – if we continue to be perceived as ineffective, we 
can be marginalized as our Dialogue Partners and international investors relegate us to sidelines” (quoted 
in Jones 2010: 494). This quote indicates concerns about both influence and resources (see Section 2.2). 
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Africa and the OAU never enjoyed the kind of successful image (and attendant soft power benefits) that 
ASEAN did during the Cold War period, so it had “less to lose” so to speak, but the continent nevertheless 
experienced a deterioration in the 1980s of its reputation with respect to policy effectiveness. Although 
African states initially experienced relatively high economic growth during the early post-decolonization 
period, by the end of the 1970s it was apparent that approaches to development taken since independence 
had not delivered positive results for these economies (UNECA 1989: 9). A world recession compounded 
existing problems and created new ones, resulting in a severe economic crisis on the continent beginning 
in the early 1980s. Prominent among the external adverse factors confronting Africa included a fall in 
primary commodities prices, ballooning external debt, and general decline in resource flows to the conti-
nent (UNECA 1989: i). Environmental conditions leading to drought in some countries exacerbated already 
severe socio-economic problems. The 1980s proved to be Africa’s “Lost Decade”: between 1980 and 1988, 
the region’s average GDP per capita fell by 25 percent and income per capita by 30 percent (Ghai/Hewitt 
de Alcantara 1990: 26f). States and regional bureaucrats began frequently complaining about Africa’s bad 
international reputation – “the image of Africa as a backward continent” (Mengistu Haile-Mariam 1984: 
14). And, although these concerns were most often discursively linked to the problem of economic margin-
alization (the logic of resources, see Section 2.2), the problem of political marginalization appeared as well 
in regional speeches and documents. 
Part of this anxiety was the threat of neglect – that Africa’s problems (economic and otherwise) would 
be increasingly ignored by the international community. In April 1990, the newly-established African 
Leadership Forum convened a high-level experts meeting with the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development in Paris “on the implications of the events in Eastern Europe,” where these concerns 
about marginalization were discussed. As then-Prime Minister of Mozambique Mario Machungo recalls, 
the meeting participants “sensed that the end of the Cold War […] had ominous consequences for Africa. 
With the cessation of the Cold War now, would Africa now be left in the cold and be on its own?” (Machungo 
2000: 4). The 1990 African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation, a product 
of a UNECA conference, emphasizes the increasing seriousness of the marginalization problem – both with 
respect to influence and resources – stating that “Africa is becoming further marginalized in world affairs, 
both geopolitically and economically” (OAU 1990c). Echoing these concerns in 1991, General Obasanjo’s 
speech at the 1991 Kampala Forum spelled out the connection between Africa’s image of dysfunction and 
its political marginalization: 
The	image	of	Africa	portrayed	by	the	outside	media	is	one	of	endless	disasters,	diseases,	senseless	wars,	
corruption	and	mismanagement.	It	is	essentially	the	image	we	presented.	Our	situation	is	now	treated	
more	by	silence	and	neglect	than	by	effective	response	[…]	We	have	to	project	positive	thinking	and	a	
positive	image	of	Africa	(Obasanjo/Mosha	1993:	33).	
Another Kampala Forum participant wrote of the problem of civil war in Africa, arguing that “the rest of 
the world has little interest, if any, to cooperate with a continent stricken by civil strife” (Obasanjo/Mosha 
1993: 221).
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3.1.2	Image	of	Virtue:	Perceptions	about	Norm	Compliance
In the cases under review here, policy-relevant actors also express concerns about external perceptions of 
their region’s (non-)compliance with international norms (especially human rights and democracy) and the 
relationship between these perceptions and the region’s political marginalization (the diminished interna-
tional influence wielded by the RO and/or its member states). 
For example, a democratic image is a soft power resource, and a democratic state that is a member of 
an organization with a reputation for being illiberal may suffer “guilt by association” and fear erosion of 
this soft power resource. Even before the 1997 financial crisis, ASEAN’s more democratic member states 
voiced concerns about ASEAN’s reputation as a “club of dictators.” A “liberal-illiberal” divide developed in 
the mid-1990s over Myanmar’s accession to the association, because it raised questions about whether 
the domestic politics of a candidate member state (e.g. its regime type and human rights record) should 
have bearing on ASEAN’s decision to admit it. The most democratic ASEAN members at the time, Thailand 
and the Philippines, grew reluctant to admit Myanmar in part because of the harmful effect the latter’s 
membership would have on the reputation of ASEAN and its member state. It is telling that the Philippines 
finally agreed to Myanmar’s admission at the 1997 summit in part because the summit itself was hosted by 
Malaysia, in Kuala Lumpur. The next year’s summit was to take place in Manila, and the Philippine govern-
ment reasoned that, if the Myanmar question were postponed to the 1998 summit, Myanmar’s accession 
would have been “more tightly and problematically linked” to Manila (Ba 2009: 120). One Philippine official 
indicated that having this event take place on Philippine soil would have been “a disaster, at least for the 
Philippines, as the ‘champion of human rights’” (quoted in Ba 2009: 120). After the fact, a Thai parliamen-
tarian criticized the decision to admit Myanmar in reference to ASEAN’s international image, explaining 
that image and influence are linked:
Because	image	is	important,	ASEAN’s	ability	to	maintain	and	enhance	its	status as an influential dip-
lomatic community	will	be	determined	not	by	the	number	of	members	but	by	the	perceived	quality	of	
membership,	which	in	turn,	is	likely	to	be	determined	by	the	quality	of	new	members…Many	groups	in	
the	West	believe	ASEAN	to	be	a	‘club	of	dictators’:	it	is	an	unjust	label,	but	an	early	admission	of	Burma	
will	simply	give	sustenance	to	this	prejudice…Why	should	the	ASEAN	governments	and	peoples	have	to	
bear	the	costs	of	the	[junta’s]	folly	and	intransigence?	(quoted	in	Acharya	2014:	106,	emphasis	mine).
In the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the problem of ASEAN’s illiberal image became more urgent. 
While ASEAN and the ASEAN Way had previously enjoyed a level of performance legitimacy based on an 
image of economic success – and had therefore been to some degree shielded from international criticism 
on human rights and democracy – the degradation of this image in the wake of the financial crisis opened 
the grouping up for criticism on non-economic issues. According to Amitav Acharya, because of its excep-
tional economic performance prior to 1997,
Southeast	Asia	was	spared	the	kind	of	vigorous	democratization	campaign	directed	by	Western	coun-
tries	 and	 financial	 institutions	 at	 the	 economically	 less	 vibrant	 African	 and	 Latin	 American	 states.	
Western	opposition	to	authoritarian	rule	in	Southeast	Asia	was	balanced	by	a	pragmatic	recognition	of	
trade	and	investment	opportunities	available	in	the	region	(Acharya	1999:	423f).
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In the post-1997 period, human rights violations in some ASEAN states produced what Anja Jetschke terms 
an “indirect negative externality” in the form of a negative reputation for ASEAN – a social cost for the 
group (Jetschke 2015). 
In his efforts to convince member states to reform the ASEAN Way in the late 1990s, Thai foreign minister 
Surin raised the problem of ASEAN’s diminished influence in the world, insisting that, “we either reform 
ourselves to meet international standards, or we can resist and be overwhelmed in the end, with no control 
over the pace or direction of change.” Echoing this, and making a more explicit connection between norm 
compliance and international influence, Surin’s deputy minister argued that “States or groups of states 
which hope to play an influential role in the international political arena […] cannot blatantly and cynically 
ignore or violate [international norms] on a sustained basis.” Instead, they must “do their utmost to make 
themselves acceptable in the eyes of the international community.” Furthermore, in affirmation of the 
“principle and practice of sovereign accountability,” ASEAN member states should have the “right to encour-
age fellow members to become more accountable to the region and to the international community” (all 
quoted in Jones 2008: 275). 
Although Surin did not succeed in convincing ASEAN to adopt his “flexible engagement” proposal, other 
members did take seriously the problem of the association’s negative image, and this shaped ASEAN prac-
tices thereafter. For example, as noted above, ASEAN has increasingly put pressure on Myanmar to make 
political reforms. As Singapore’s foreign minister stated in 2007, “we have to take issue with a member 
[Myanmar] who behaved badly and brought down the image of everyone” (quoted in Jetschke 2015: 122). 
According to Lee Jones, ASEAN’s attempts to “discipline” Myanmar have been aimed at “regain[ing] inter-
national political and economic ‘relevance’ […] in the wake of the financial crisis” (Jones 2009b: 388). In 
other words, both the logic of influence and resources were at play.
In the African case, regional actors’ concerns about norm non-compliance are most often linked to prob-
lems of economic (rather than political) marginalization. Nonetheless, perceptions of norm non-compli-
ance and related diminished international influence were not wholly irrelevant for policy-relevant actors 
on the continent. For example, former UNECA economist and then co-director of the African Leadership 
Forum, Felix Mosha, wrote at length in his background paper to the 1991 Kampala Forum about the image 
of Africa as “a crucial determination of Africa’s standing in world affairs” (Obasanjo/Mosha 1993: 208). In 
order to give Africa “a greater moral standing and say in world affairs” (i.e. influence), Mosha called for 
African states to address, among other things, the problems of corruption, unequal treatment of citizens, 
non-compliance with labor standards, and overall disrespect for the “African person” (Obasanjo/Mosha 
1993: 209f). 
In the late 1990s, post-apartheid South African leaders were particularly interested in cultivating a dem-
ocratic image of Africa, and some of their justifications were related to the need to enhance Africa’s (but 
especially South Africa’s) international influence. According to Thomas Kwasi Tieku, Thabo Mbeki sought 
pro-democracy reforms at the OAU in order that it shed its “dictators’ club” image (which reflected back 
poorly on South Africa). This improved international image would in turn enable South Africa to “play its 
effective and rightful role on the global terrain” (Tieku 2004: 255). 
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3.2	Image	Matters	because	It	Impacts	a	Region’s	Ability	to	Attract	Resources
In addition to diminishing soft power, negative perceptions of a region/RO can result in decreased resource 
flows to that region from investors and donors – this is the economic component of marginalization refer-
enced above. Jetschke’s concept of image as indirect externality is again useful here (Jetschke 2015). States 
in the same region are bound to one another because of that region’s “brand.” Simon Anholt, developer of 
the Anholt Nation Brands Index, writes that “places have images just as products and corporations have im-
ages, and […] places depend to a similar extent on the power and appeal of those images for their progress 
and prosperity” (Anholt 2007: 11). Furthermore, “[…] the advance of globalization means that every coun-
try, city and region must compete with every other for its share of the world’s commercial, political, social, 
and cultural transactions. In such an environment, as in any busy marketplace, brand image becomes a 
critical factor; the necessary short cut to an informed buying decision” (Anholt 2007: 4). 
This section is organized according to the two primary relevant audiences: donors and investors. The two 
categories of perceived attributes established in Section 2.1, policy effectiveness and norm compliance, 
remain relevant, and, as before, they are interrelated.
3.2.1	Donor	Perceptions
When it comes to foreign aid, a regional image of underdevelopment and dysfunction (ineffectiveness) is 
a double-edged sword; on the one hand, donors might prioritize the neediest recipients, but on the other 
hand, donors might come to perceive these recipients as “lost causes.” In a statement at a 1988 conference 
organized by the African Leadership Forum titled “For Improving the Economic and Social Situation in 
Africa,” UNECA Executive Secretary Adedeji emphasized this very point: 
There	is	a	complete	and	cynical	change	in	the	attitude	of	the	international	community	towards	the	de-
velopment	process,	implying	that	since	in	any	case	developing	countries	will	never	make	it,	why	should	
one	bother	about	them?	When	I	recently	met	two	US	Congressmen,	both	wondered	why	more	American	
taxpayers’	money	should	be	devoted	to	the	development	of	Africa	[…]	In	1986,	the	countries	of	the	world	
agreed	for	the	first	time	at	a	special	session	of	the	UN	General	Assembly	that	something	had	to	be	done	
to	improve	the	situation	of	Africa.	Yet,	just	three	months	later,	the	USA	reduced	its	Official	Development	
Assistance	to	Africa	by	40	per	cent	in	spite	of	all	pleas	[…]	(African	Leadership	Forum	1988:	39).		
Later in the session, he called for Africa to “get our house in order to attract the foreign aid we need to 
get ourselves out of the woods” (African Leadership Forum 1988: 39). UNECA’s 1987 Abuja Statement on 
Economic Recovery and Long-Term Development in Africa makes a similar point about the problem of 
economic marginalization: “One of the major challenges that faces Africa is how to sustain international 
public interest on Africa’s long-term development though continuous and effective communication that 
will reach all levels of society” (UNECA 1987). 
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One civil society participant in the African Leadership Forum’s 1991 Kampala Forum rang similar alarms about 
perceptions of policy ineffectiveness, or what he called the “crisis of confidence in the continent in the closely 
related areas of economic and political management” (Obasanjo/Mosha 1993: 13). He quoted an article 
from The	Economist	of the same year that read in part “With cold-war interests gone, it is tempting to forget 
Africa […] Besides, aid to black Africa has a depressing record. In the 1980s, the region swallowed more than 
$100 billion of it and defiantly got poorer. Perhaps money for Eastern Europe would be money better spent.”10 
At the Kampala Forum, there was also discussion of the threat of this aid diversion in terms of regime 
type and the attractiveness of aiding new democracies in Eastern Europe (Obasanjo/Mosha 1993: 99) as 
well as donors’ “increased pressure upon African governments for similar democratization and popular 
participation” (Obasanjo/Mosha 1993: 237). Donors’ punishment of a region for its perceived illiberalism 
(norm non-compliance) is relevant to the Southeast Asian case as well. Writing in the wake of the 1997 
Asian financial crisis, Acharya observed that “[R]egional groupings of authoritarian states, or groupings 
that reluctantly tolerate authoritarianism out of deference to the principle of non-interference, are un-
likely to find sympathy and support from international donors […] more aid is now available to regional 
groupings which promote democracy and human rights” (Acharya 2003: 378). Indeed, as suggested above, 
the West arguably used the 1997 financial crisis as an opportunity to hold ASEAN states accountable for 
illiberal practices. The crisis had weakened the Asian Values discourse sermonized by authoritarian leaders 
in the region by calling into question the supposed positive relationship between the kinds of illiberalism 
practiced by some Asian regimes and the incredible growth experienced by their economies in the pre-
1997 years. Two democratic regimes – Thailand and South Korea – managed recovery better than did 
authoritarian Indonesia. Southeast Asian states became more vulnerable to international pressure – from 
the International Monetary Fund and Western donors – to liberalize (economically and politically) than 
they had been when their economies were strong (Acharya 1999: 419). 
Western governments and international institutions pointed to “market-distorting connections between 
Asian governments and business” as responsible for the crisis (Narine 2002: 185) and, whereas earlier 
economic successes had been attributed to – and authoritarian rule justified by – Asian Values, the 1997 
economic crisis was blamed in part on these same Asian Values (Acharya 1999: 419). In June 1998, U.S. 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright delivered a speech attributing the relative success of Korea, the 
Philippines, and Thailand in managing the economic crisis to their democratic governance, specifically, that 
“their people were able to elect new governments, which started work in a climate of openness and trust, 
and with the moral legitimacy to call for shared sacrifice” (quoted in Acharya 1999: 421). 
3.2.2	Investor	Perceptions
Perceptions related to policy ineffectiveness and/or norm non-compliance can also dissuade investors. It is 
not just the reputation of the individual states that matters, but that of the region/RO itself. In her recent 
book “The Company States Keep: International Economic Organizations and Investor Perceptions,” Julia 
10 The	Economist, 2 February 1991, p. 17, quoted in Obasanjo/Mosha 1993: 17f.
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Gray finds that one “short cut” investors use (when evaluating political risk in a candidate country) is the 
reputation of other countries that “keep company” with the candidate country (through membership in a 
regional organization). In other words, states bear the costs or reap the rewards of the reputations of those 
states with whom they formally associate, because investors have incomplete information (Gray 2013).  
Language from the outcome document of a 1990 conference convened by the African Leadership Forum 
tied concerns about economic marginalization to investors’ perceptions about Africa:
Perceptions	on	political	instability	are	perhaps	the	greatest	impediments	to	FDI	in	Africa.	[…]	To	a	large	
measure,	 the	present	 level	of	FDI	 in	Africa	 is	also	a	reflection	of	certain	negative,	but	not	necessar-
ily	correct	perceptions	of	Africa	by	potential	investors	[…]	The	negative	perceptions	Western	investors	
tend	to	have	concerning	Africa	as	a	whole	combine	to	create	a	rather	unpromising	situation.	African	
Governments	should	therefore	combat	these	negative	perceptions	concerning	the	overall	investment	
climate	on	the	continent.	This	may	have	to	be	done	at	the	level	of	individual	countries,	the	OAU	and	
international	organizations”	(African	Leadership	Forum	1990:	8,	22). 
A Kampala Forum (1991) participant also stressed the relationship between perceptions of insecurity and 
instability in Africa and decreased investment, citing the “decapitalization or divestures from Africa aris-
ing from perceived or real risk assessments” and the compounding and generalization of the divestment 
problem due to the fact that investors decline to “seriously invest in regions from which foreign capital was 
fleeing” (Obasanjo/Mosha 1993: 222).
With respect to illiberalism (norm non-compliance), Thabo Mbeki, who was particularly enthusiastic about 
democracy and human rights promotion on the continent, justified his efforts primarily with reference to 
Africa’s need to achieve a more liberal image in the world, in order to counter Afro-pessimism and attract 
foreign direct investment. He reasoned that firms are wary of investing in Africa, because its countries, as a 
group, have a reputation for not respecting rights, including property rights (Tieku 2004: 253). According to 
Thomas Kwasi Tieku, because the African continent’s international reputation regarding the protection of 
rights – including property rights – was “tainted,” the ruling party in South Africa was motivated to seek out 
ways to improve this collective image (Tieku 2004: 253). Early on in his term, Mbeki vehemently criticized 
one-party and personal rule on the continent, even encouraging citizens of African countries to “resist all 
tyranny,” because “[i]n Africa, the people must govern” (quoted in Landsberg 2000: 108). Tieku further 
argues that South Africa’s push for a new continental body (the African Union) had been, since Nelson 
Mandela’s administration, “at the core” of post-apartheid South Africa’s principal goal of “improv[ing] the 
image of Africa in order to attract foreign investment and make the new South Africa an important global 
trading nation” (Tieku 2004: 253).
In the Southeast Asian case, regional actors have made many public statements about the problem of 
investor perceptions in the wake of the 1997 financial crisis and beyond. These statements did not only 
come from those leading calls for reform, like Thailand in the late 1990s and Indonesia in the 2000s. As 
quoted above, in 2000, Singapore’s foreign minister linked perceptions of ASEAN as an “ineffective […] 
sunset organization” to the threat of economic marginalization and ASEAN’s relegation “to the sidelines” 
by international investors (quoted in Jones 2010: 494). Later that decade, Singapore’s prime minister 
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articulated concerns about the danger of ASEAN “fall[ing] off the radar screen of international companies 
and investors” if it turned a blind eye to human rights violations in Myanmar (quoted in Jetschke 2015: 122). 
Indeed, Jetschke and Murray attribute much of ASEAN’s institutional development in the 2000s to its mem-
bers’ shared desire to recapture international relevance and legitimacy and “as a consequence a stream of 
urgently needed foreign direct investment” (Jetschke/Murray 2012: 181f). For its part, Indonesia, which 
established itself as a leader of human rights and democracy-promotion in ASEAN from the mid-2000s, was 
partially motivated by a desire to repair its international reputation with respect to political stability and 
economic dynamism and thereby “reinvigorate” its economy (Sukma 2011: 111f).
4. Collective Image Management Strategies 
I have so far discussed why states and others care about collective image – I now turn to what they (might) 
do about it. In this section, I present two ways to categorize image management strategies (see Section 
3.1. and 3.2.). First though, I will touch on the problem of actorness. A region is a less unitary actor than 
is a state. The process through which image management strategies are formulated and enacted is com-
plicated by lack of consensus about the problem (Does the region have a bad image? How important a 
problem is this?) and the solution (Should we change our norms to change our image?) as well as collective 
action problems (Who will assume leadership?). In neither case under review was there total consensus 
about the nature of the region’s negative image or the best course of action to take to address this problem. 
In the African case, regional bureaucrats (at the OAU and UNECA) took the lead in calling for OAU reforms, 
in part as an image management strategy. They launched this campaign in collaboration with likeminded 
state actors, but their role was very important. In the ASEAN case, regional bureaucrats seem to have less 
power, and state actors (e.g. Thailand’s foreign minister in the late 1990s and Indonesia’s in the 2000s) took 
the lead in calling for measures (involving some reforms to the ASEAN Way) to improve ASEAN’s image. 
Certain kinds of states may be more likely to take interest in managing certain kinds of negative perceptions 
and might therefore take a leadership role in image management efforts. As discussed above, regime type 
is consequential. States interested in telegraphing a democratic image are not always satisfied to promote 
their own domestic quality of democracy – they might also be keen to manage the democratic image of 
their region. Being a member of an organization with a reputation as a “dictators’ club” – a term used to 
describe both the OAU and ASEAN at various points in their histories – might detract from the democratic 
image of that member state vis-à-vis the international community. That is, despite the domestic and for-
eign policies of any particular member state, it may suffer (by association) from the negative perception 
extraregional actors have of the region and/or regional organization based on its illiberalism. 
In the end, because regions are made up of diverse actors, it is most fruitful to think of regional image conscious-
ness as something that certain actors can exploit in their efforts to gain support within the region for particular 
regional policies. Reform proponents can frame their policy proposals as regional image management strate-
gies in order to persuade. In the cases discussed here, those seeking to circumscribe the non-interference norm 
and create more intrusive regional institutions used the regional image management frame to make their case. 
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4.1	Emulation	versus	Distinction
In their piece “Status, Identity, and Rising Powers,” Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko (2010) 
draw on Social Identity Theory to outline strategies that states use to “achieve a more positive, distinct 
identity” and improve their international standing (Larson/Shevchenko 2010: 8).11 One strategy is to emu-
late the “institutions, values, or ideology of the dominant states” (Larson/Shevchenko 2010: 11). This will 
look familiar to scholars of international diffusion as the emulation mechanism (Simmons/Dobbin/Garrett 
2006). Another strategy, which the authors argue is more appealing to emerging powers, is for states to dis-
tinguish themselves in a non-emulative way, reevaluating negative attributes as positive, promoting new 
norms or institutional models, and otherwise setting themselves apart, positively (Larson/ Shevchenko 
2010: 15). The authors cite “normative power Europe” as an example of this strategy. Instead of competing 
with the United States on military might, Europe found a new dimension of superiority. 
We might interpret ASEAN’s international promotion of its ASEAN Way in the 1990s (see Section 2.1.1) 
as an instance of this second strategy. Relatedly, Singapore and Malaysia also promoted a set of domes-
tic norms – the so-called “Asian values discourse” – as a successful alternative to “Western” norms, and 
ASEAN’s inter-state norms were in part justified as an international complement to these domestic norms. 
The grouping was able to do this in part because of the region’s image of (especially economic) success. 
According to Thomas Risse and Stephen Ropp, “The Asian values debate demonstrates that some states 
command sufficient international legitimacy to establish a counter-discourse to Western-led human rights 
arguments.” Because Southeast Asian states “command powerful social resources which allow them to 
fight off external pressure,” they are less “socially vulnerable” than they otherwise would be (Risse/Ropp 
2013: 21).
When the ASEAN Way was called into question in the wake of the 1997 financial crisis, however, this strat-
egy became less viable and pressure built for ASEAN to shift norms and conform more to Western liberal 
internationalism (Larson and Shevchenko’s first strategy). ASEAN engaged in institution building in attempt 
to improve its image – its members established EU style institutions in the 2000s: the ASEAN Economic, 
Security, and Socio-Cultural Communities. The adoption of 2007 ASEAN Charter also indicates some emu-
lation. Traditionally averse to legalistic regionalism, ASEAN did not adopt a charter at its founding in 1967. 
It finally did so forty years later, providing the association with a more formal legal status and institutional 
framework. As Anja Jetschke and Philomena Murray argue, this institution building can best be explained 
as emulation – ASEAN emulated EU institutions (albeit superficially, without sacrificing sovereignty in a 
meaningful way) because they faced a crisis of reputation in the 2000s (Jetschke/Murray 2012).
When the OAU began making reforms to regional institutions in the early 1990s, circumscribing the norm 
of non-interference in favor of a more intrusive form of regionalism, it may have been emulating European 
regionalism to some degree. One reform proponent, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, used the ar-
gument that “If the European countries can surrender some of their sovereignty for further development, 
African states can similarly surrender some sovereignty for greater security, both at the intra and inter-state 
levels [...]” (Obasanjo/Mosha 1993: 266). The nature of some African regional institutional developments 
11 Larson and Shevchenko use the term “identity” where I would use “image.”  
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over the course of the 1990s suggests, though, that the enactment of regional policy changes was not 
simply, or even primarily, an emulation exercise. For example, the establishment in 1993 of a regional con-
flict mechanism mandated to manage intrastate disputes and the inclusion of a “Responsibility to Protect” 
provision in the African Union’s 2000 Constitutive Act (Article 4h) were innovative rather than emulative. 
This does not mean that these developments were not part of an image management strategy – I argue 
they were. It suggests, though, that these reforms targeted the perceived root causes of Africa’s negative 
image (e.g. civil conflict) rather than the perceptions directly.
4.2	Cosmetic	“Branding”	Efforts	versus	Substantive	Policy	Changes
One important way in which regional image management varies is the degree to which regional policies 
are changed – that is, are the management efforts more superficial or transformational? In the field of 
communications, “nation branding” is a concept that refers to “a compendium of discourses and practices 
aimed at reconstituting nationhood through marketing and branding paradigms” (Kaneva 2011: 118). At 
the regional level, this implies reconstitution of the region (a macro-nation) rather than the nation state. At 
the national level, branding may be more so cosmetic (e.g. logos and slogans) (Kaneva 2011: 118) or may 
in fact be “a component of national policy” incorporated into “planning, governance or economic devel-
opment” (Anholt 2008: 23). Applied to the regional level, branding might also involve logos and slogans or 
may be a more transformational endeavor, incorporated into regional policy-making. Another way to think 
about this is whether image management strategies target perceptions per se or target the underlying 
problems that are understood to feed these perceptions. 
The African case falls closer to the “real changes” end of the continuum with its so-called “shift from non-in-
terference to non-indifference” that brought major reforms, including the establishment of the African 
Union, a much more interventionist organization than its predecessor (Coe 2015a). The Southeast Asian 
case falls closer to the “superficial branding” side, although some substantive changes to institutions and 
practices have taken place there. There are many possible reasons for this. First, it must be emphasized that 
the post-Cold War regional reform process that took place in Africa was not solely driven by image manage-
ment imperatives, but also by longer-term processes at the OAU (Williams 2007), domestic pressures, and 
new international policy discourses linking security and development problems and solutions (Coe 2015b). 
Second, the norm of non-interference had long been more contested in African international society than 
among the ASEAN states, and it had already eroded somewhat over the course of the Cold War at the OAU 
while remaining relatively robust in Southeast Asia (Coe 2015b). Finally, Africa’s economic crisis was much 
longer and deeper than the 1997 financial crisis.
4.2.1 The African Case
As partially discussed above, the secretariats of the OAU and UNECA launched a regional reform cam-
paign in the early 1990s in collaboration with the African Leadership Forum. They appealed for changes 
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to sovereignty norms in Africa and for the development of regional institutions mandated to manage do-
mestic-level governance and security problems. The logic of these proposals was this: in order to combat 
Africa’s (and the OAU’s) image of dysfunction, to attract international investment and resources, and to 
create the conditions for economic development, Africa must take collective responsibility for the prob-
lems of the continent and, through its regional institutions, promote peace and democracy. The African 
Leadership Forum presented a set of policy proposals to the OAU General Assembly in the early 1990s (the 
Kampala Document) and hoped that it would be integrated into OAU frameworks, but it was considered 
many times without adoption. The OAU did, however, adopt other declarations reflecting the ideas of the 
Kampala movement. At the 1990 summit, the heads of state adopted the Declaration on the Political and 
Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World, directly re-
sponding to Secretary General’s critical report published earlier that year. This declaration affirmed that the 
troubling concerns outlined by Salim “constitute major factors which should guide Africa’s collective think-
ing about the challenges and options before her in the 1990s in view of the real threat of marginalization 
on the continent (OAU 1990b: 1).” The document focused on the precarious nature of Africa’s “socio-eco-
nomic situation,” but then linked this situation to domestic governance and security problems. It was the 
first Assembly declaration to make an explicit connection between economic development and intrastate 
conflict management, concluding that “it is only through the creation of stable conditions” that Africa can 
achieve development, and vowing to “work together towards the peaceful and speedy resolution of all the 
conflicts on our continent” (OAU 1990b: 2).
According to former Nigerian Ambassador Sam Ibok, the 1990 Declaration “marked a decisive turning point” 
for African regionalism because the OAU for the first time recognized that internal conflicts demanded 
“a more dynamic approach, given the African preoccupations with […] sovereignty and non-interference” 
(Ibok 2000: 5). The Declaration “provoked” a debate among African leaders about the relationship among 
governance, conflict and economic development, “set the stage for a review of past OAU approaches to 
conflict resolution,” and brought about an “improved environment, which no doubt facilitated the exten-
sive consultations” carried out between Secretary General Salim and member states about the creation of 
a permanent conflict management mechanism (Ibok 2000: 7).
Following the 1990 Declaration, Salim proceeded to consult with member states about operationalizing 
a regional conflict management role, and in 1992 generated a report providing recommendations for the 
specifics of a conflict management mechanism. In 1993, the heads of state adopted a declaration formally 
establishing a permanent Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution. This mecha-
nism not only replaced the organization’s defunct Mechanism for Mediation, Arbitration and Conciliation 
(provided for by the 1963 OAU Charter) but also expanded its competences to include intrastate (as well as 
interstate) conflict. “Rather remarkably for an organization that hitherto has avoided involvement in inter-
nal conflicts, the new OAU Mechanism has a clear mandate to concern itself with such conflicts” (Martin 
2002: 197).
The 1990-93 period saw an important rise in regional interference in domestic political and security affairs: 
the OAU dispatched its first election observation mission, the African Commission for Human and People’s 
Rights began publishing country reports, mediation became a prominent tool of the OAU, and two OAU 
military missions were deployed to civil conflicts. This trend in practices – along with the legalization of 
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these practices – accelerated over the course of the decade (Coe 2015a). Regional actors responded to six 
crises with military deployment during the decade, and three of these took place in the 1990-93 period. 
Two were OAU deployments, one to Rwanda (established in 1991) and one to Burundi (established in 1993). 
In the case of Rwanda, Secretary Salim “seized upon” the Rwandan Patriotic Front’s rebellion in 1990 “as 
an important test case by which to test the preparedness of Organization to embark on a new, more inter-
ventionist path” (Berman/Sams 2000: 58).
The establishment in 1993 of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution was an 
important step towards “non-indifference,” but the OAU had limitations, and these pushed Africa towards 
the creation of a new regional body, the African Union. The Rwandan genocide (1994), in which approxi-
mately 800,000 people were killed in 100 days, exposed the incapacity of the regional community (as well 
as the global community, for that matter) to prevent mass atrocity, even with the new conflict mechanism. 
The OAU had set up an African Peace Fund in 1993 to facilitate international donations (Martin 2000: 198), 
but money was not the only issue. By the late 1990s, analysts called for “serious reforms and reorganization” 
of the OAU, including a revised charter and a strengthened general secretariat (Packer/Rukare 2002: 367-
369), in order to give regional institutions the tools needed to manage governance and security on the con-
tinent. The content of the African Union’s mandate reflects proposals put forward by South Africa’s second 
post-Apartheid President Thabo Mbeki and Nigeria’s Olusegun Obasanjo (who led the African Leadership 
forum and won the Nigerian presidency in 1999). These proposals were based on similar regional policy 
platforms, the Kampala Document and the African Renaissance, respectively, which both aimed to broaden 
the OAU’s mandate and capacity in its promotion of democracy, human rights, and intrastate security, em-
ploying a “comprehensive concept of security including ‘human security’” (Moller 2009: 10).
 
4.2.2 The Southeast Asian Case
The institutional reforms that we see in the Southeast Asian case are generally more superficial. The estab-
lishment of the ASEAN Security and Socio-Cultural Communities and the ASEAN Charter were motivated 
in part by ASEAN states’ desire to recapture the association’s “economic and political relevance” and to 
“project a reformist, progressive image” of the region as a whole (Jones 2010: 494). However, these insti-
tutional developments did not in fact entail much modification to ASEAN’s core norms. As Jetschke and 
Murray argue, the Communities and Charter were the result of “selective emulation” of EU institutions, but 
without the associated sovereignty sacrifice (Jetschke/Murray 2012: 176). The 2007 ASEAN Charter (which 
entered into force in 2008) was proposed in 2005, and an Eminent Persons Group12 was formed to develop 
the document. Echoing Thailand’s former foreign minister’s “flexible engagement” proposal, Indonesia’s 
representative to the group argued for “an agreed mechanism through which member states could work 
together to help a member country in addressing internal problems with clear external implications” and 
more broadly that, although “respect for sovereignty must remain a basic principle of ASEAN,” a more 
12 A group of ten prominent individuals, one from each ASEAN member state, tasked with developing “bold and vi-
sionary ideas to strengthen ASEAN.” See page 2 of the Report of the Eminent Persons Group on the ASEAN Charter 
(December 2006), accessed at http://www.asean.org/storage/images/archive/19247.pdf; 10 April 2017.
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flexible interpretation of non-interference should be adopted (“we have to be non-doctrinaire in some of 
these things”) (Sukma 2011: 113). In the end, though, the ASEAN Charter mostly codifies existing norms, 
and the working group’s least conservative recommendations, including sanctions for member non-com-
pliance with ASEAN rules and majority voting procedures (to replace consensus decision making), were not 
incorporated. The charter does contain several affirmations of ASEAN’s commitment to democracy and 
human rights, but these are not accompanied by enforcement mechanisms.
Still, a modest norm shift can be detected in the years since 1997. Evidence of this can be found in high 
profile instances of public criticism by ASEAN member states against each other beginning in the late 1990s. 
For example, when the Malaysian prime minister dismissed and jailed the deputy prime minister in 1998, 
Indonesia and the Philippines publicly criticized Kuala Lumpur for violating the official’s due process and 
other human rights. According to Acharya, this incidence “may have been the first time that the head of 
state of an ASEAN state had complained directly about human rights violations in a fellow member state” 
(Acharya 1999: 430).
Next, when the UN Security Council authorized a multinational peacekeeping force to be deployed in East 
Timor in 1999, ASEAN states initially held reservations about the force; they were wary of the decision to 
allow the mission to operate under a Chapter XII mandate, and they worried that it would set a precedent 
for future Western-initiated interventions (Dupont 2000: 164). Within ASEAN, democratic Thailand and the 
Philippines were “the most sympathetic” to humanitarian intervention in East Timor (Khong/Nesadurai 
2007: 46). In the end, though, Malaysia and Singapore joined Thailand and the Philippines in contributing 
troops to the multinational force. According to Alan Dupont, since ASEAN’s “initial low key response” to 
the violence in East Timor had “deepened skepticism in the West about the organization’s usefulness,” 
Southeast Asian states were concerned about their reputation, which was “on the line” because of ASEAN’s 
“inability to respond effectively to the economic crisis or ameliorate the anti-democratic behavior of Burma” 
(Dupont 2000: 167f). 
Furthermore, since the financial crisis, ASEAN has, as noted above, increasingly put pressure on Myanmar 
to make political reforms. ASEAN denied Myanmar its turn at the association’s chairmanship in 2006 be-
cause it had not made sufficient progress on democratic reforms (this was considered a “minor defeat for 
the non-interference doctrine”). Malaysia even suggested that Myanmar might risk expulsion if it con-
tinued on its current path (although this harsh approach was never seriously considered by the group) 
(Acharya 2014: 223). Over the next several years, ASEAN increasingly issued critical statements and ap-
plied “mild pressure” on the repressive regime. This constitutes a change in its non-interference policy 
(but not a major change) (Acharya 2014: 223). Finally, as Anja Jetschke argues, the creation of the ASEAN 
Intergovernmental Commission for Human Rights in (2009) was aimed at improving human rights in the 
region (and particularly in Myanmar) in order to combat ASEAN’s negative image with respect to human 
rights (Jetschke 2015). 
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5. Conclusion
States in the same region are bound together not just by shared borders, conflict spillover, and economic 
interdependence, but also by the ways in which the world imagines them as a collective. They reap the ben-
efits or suffer the consequences of these associations, and they use regional cooperation, when possible, 
as a means to have a voice in global affairs and to manage globalization. Especially for states in the global 
South, the image or reputation of the region to which they belong can significantly impact their ability to 
influence international politics and attract resources, and so we should expect to – and do – see states and 
other policy-relevant regional actors seeking to manage this image, sometimes through emulation, and 
sometimes through distinction. Importantly for the study of comparative regional governance, these man-
agement efforts can contribute to significant changes in regional norms and institutions. Collective image 
management is of course not the only force driving normative and institutional change at the regional 
level; other material and non-material factors shape these developments and interact with image con-
sciousness and management in complex ways. This paper simply seeks to draw attention to an important 
yet overlooked aspect of these causal processes – collective regional image – and to begin to unpack its 
logics and associated modes of collective action.
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